TLDR This is an excerpt from the book DAOs & Purpose-Driven Tokens where I analyze not only Bitcoin the currency but the whole Bitcoin payment network including its stakeholders and the power structures that emerged between the different network stakeholders over time. The focus of this analysis is less on the technical details, but rather on the social and economic dynamics of the Bitcoin network. For readability purposes I shortened the chapter. It is still very long, so take your time when reading it, or skip to sections you might find more interesting:

THE ANALYSIS COVERS FOLLOWING TOPICS

• How the Bitcoin network started
• Political principles
• Functional design
• Stakeholders
• Token types & token properties
• Economic mechanisms
• Governance, protocol upgrades & network splits
• Power Structures
• Purpose & reality of the network

PURPOSE & HOW IT STARTED

POLITICAL PRINCIPLES

• Disintermediation, decentralization & censorship resistance Disintermediation through decentralization of governance and operations seems to have been the core principle when conceptualizing Bitcoin. P2P maintenance of the network was considered a means of guaranteeing autonomy from state-based censorship (read more in the book).
• Open source, public & permissionless infrastructure Satoshi created the Bitcoin protocol as open-source code to provide distributed control over protocol evolution. Maintenance and usage of the network was also designed to be public and permissionless. The idea was that anyone with the adequate skills can contribute to the protocol evolution in a public manner (i.e. become a developer), anyone can use the network as a payment system (i.e. become a user), or become mining node operator and write transactions to the ledger without needing to ask anyone else within the network for permission to do so.
• Irreversible transactions The term “immutability,” which became a dogma among many early crypto enthusiasts, was not used in the original Bitcoin white paper. Satoshi only wrote about making transactions irreversible, which seems to have been a rather practical decision and not a dogmatic one, because reversing accidental transactions would not have allowed for maintaining a clear consensus on the ledger’s history in a distributed network. Making Bitcoin transactions irreversible was a highly contentious topic among early Bitcoin developers — the trade-offs were clear to everyone involved in the decision (read more in the book).
• Privacy Privacy was seen as an important political principle. However, the act of publicly broadcasting all transactions — such that the network nodes can reach distributed consensus — was a crucial design feature that was needed to circumvent the double spending problem (read more in the book).

Functional Design

• Money could not be represented by a digital file:(more details in the book).
• Identification of token holders & digital signatures:(more details in the book).
• Peer-to-peer distributed timestamping:(more details in the book).

Stakeholders

• Mining node operators (aka “miners”) Mining nodes participate in the process of Proof-of-Work, to execute the main function for achieving the network purpose: collective transaction verification and processing in the absence of trusted intermediaries. Mining node operators need to download the client software (or code their own client, given the specifications in the protocol), and install it on a computer (the client). They also need to download the dataset with all historic Bitcoin transactions. Once this is done, this computer/node/client can communicate and coordinate with other mining nodes via the process of Proof-of-Work, by competing for the right to create new blocks, adding transactions to the ledger and scooping the block reward. In addition to the block reward, miners can also earn transaction fees. Mining nodes are the only stakeholder group that can actively vote on changes to the network rules.
• Full node operators (aka “full nodes”) were not conceptualized as an independent stakeholder in the white paper. They emerged over the years, as operating mining nodes became a profitable business and started to require expensive special-purpose hardware in the form of CPU, so one could compete in finding the pseudo-random number of the Proof-of-Work puzzle. More and more people started to operate Bitcoin clients that only contained the data-set with all historic Bitcoin transactions, but without participating in the process of Proof-of-Work. Operating a node with only the full ledger data does not require special-purpose hardware and can be done on any home PC with standard processing hardware. It allows the operators to verify the integrity of transactions when receiving Bitcoins and when they are being added to the ledger, without having to rely on any third-party service. Verifying transactions is an independent function from Bitcoin mining, but it is not independently incentivized with a network token, since such functional independence was not conceptualized when the Bitcoin protocol was being designed. Eventually, the number of full node operators declined, and only individuals and institutions that sent and received frequent Bitcoin payments started to operate their own full nodes for independence, security and quicker transaction verification. At the time of writing this book, operating a full node has become a software service, which is often outsourced to specialized service providers. Fewer and fewer people and institutions are managing their own full node anymore. This has reintroduced principal-agent problems, which Bitcoin’s creators wanted to eradicate in the first place.
• Mining pools are another stakeholder group that were not envisioned at the inception of the protocol. They emerged over the years as individual miners began to collaborate. They pool their CPU (Central Processing Units) such that the collective of miners have more cumulative hash power than each miner participating in the pool would have on their own. This way, the pool participants can boost their chances at being the fastest entity to solve the puzzle and write a block of transactions to the ledger, all without needing to operate their own full node. Only the mining pool operator needs to maintain the whole data set of all historic transactions.
• Light nodes (or SPV nodes) In the white paper, Satoshi envisioned that certain computers, such as smartphones and other small devices, would not be able to maintain the whole ledger and would only be able to participate in a process of “simplified payment verification” or “SPV.” Light nodes were designed to only store copies of the block-headers of all the transaction blocks. They cannot verify transactions autonomously and have to trust the information given out by other nodes who run the full ledger on their computers.
• Users aka Bitcoin holders Any individual or institution owning Bitcoin is a user of the Bitcoin network and can send and receive Bitcoin P2P, by using a Bitcoin client with a Bitcoin wallet. The act of sending Bitcoins requires the payment of a network transaction fee, which is conducted in Bitcoins and is directly paid to mining node operators. In the very early days of Bitcoin, all users operated full nodes and also participated in the process of Proof-of-Work. Eventually, some users stopped participating in the mining process and only operated full nodes for sending and receiving Bitcoins. As both Bitcoin and mobile phones became more popular, more and more Bitcoin holders started to migrate to mobile wallets (which are light nodes) or began to manage their Bitcoins over special hardware devices (hardware wallets). In all of these cases, they kept full control over their private keys, and therefore full control over their assets. Today, however, most Bitcoin holders have outsourced the management of their Bitcoins to third-party financial services providers and have no control over their private keys and therefore their Bitcoins. As a result, most Bitcoin payments today are not conducted P2P anymore. Bitcoins are predominantly sent and received using intermediary services — such as merchants, exchanges and banks — without the Bitcoin holder operating their own Bitcoin node.
• Custodial wallet operators (exchanges & banks) When Bitcoin was conceptualized, it was assumed that everyone would operate their own Bitcoin client on their own hardware device. As previously mentioned, reality unfolded quite differently. Most Bitcoin owners today do not mine Bitcoin. Instead, they buy Bitcoins from centralized financial service providers, such as centralized exchanges or traditional banks, who manage the Bitcoins of their customers on their private servers. Unless these customers withdraw their Bitcoin into their own self-hosted wallets, they can only access their Bitcoins via custodial wallets operated by their service providers — without access to the private key and therefore without autonomous control over their assets. This defies the whole purpose of Bitcoin as P2P money. Adding insult to injury, these service providers very often do not operate Bitcoin full nodes to verify sending and receiving transactions anymore. Instead, they use the specialized services of companies such as “Blockdeamon” (a full node service provider) or “Fireblocks” (a wallets-as-a-service provider). Not only does this reintroduce the principal-agent problem — when exchanges and their service providers go bankrupt or are hacked — it also means that on top of the Bitcoin network transaction fees, the senders of Bitcoins now also need to pay additional management fees to the banks or exchanges managing their Bitcoins, who in exchange pay service fees to the full node operator and wallet as a service providers.
• Software & hardware wallet developers Wallets are Bitcoin applications that provide a user interface for Bitcoin users. These wallets can be software-based or hardware-based and charge a fee for their services. Software wallets can be downloaded on computers and mobile devices, while hardware wallets are special-purpose devices, in the size of a USB stick. Both software and hardware wallets act as a keychain for one’s Bitcoins (and other crypto assets). Hardware wallets are considered much safer than software wallets that are operated on a regular computer or mobile phone. The main purpose of any wallet is to keep one’s private keys — that allow access and control of one’s Bitcoin — offline and away from the Internet. In the early days of Bitcoin, people stored their private keys on their computers or mobile devices. This approach came with risks, as malware or hackers could potentially compromise these devices and steal the private keys. To resolve this issue, independent developers began creating hardware wallets for non-tech users. They empowered Bitcoin users to manage their Bitcoins in a sovereign and safe way. With the emergence of alternative cryptocurrencies, the need for wallets with multi-blockchain capabilities has grown, since users are not likely to use different applications for each different token they own. Today, wallet providers increasingly offer interfaces with exchanges and other DeFi protocols and CeFi services. They have also gained market power as an on-ramp and off-ramp to more traditional financial services. Wallet providers can influence innovation, industry standards and user adoption — shaping the behavior of users and the practices of other service providers.
• Token exchanges & banks When Bitcoin was first deployed for test reasons, many network functionalities were not conceptualized or implemented yet — such as exchanging Bitcoins for other currencies or assets. The original founders and contributors probably never expected that enough people would be interested in exchanging their Bitcoins or using it for payments, at least not for the foreseeable future. However, as more and more people started to experiment with the network — installing their own nodes, contributing to Proof-of-Work and mining Bitcoins — the demand for exchanging Bitcoins for other digital currencies such as Linden Dollar (the currency of the virtual reality platform “Second Life”) or fiat currencies grew. Second Life already had the means to exchange their virtual currency, the Linden Dollar, for U.S. Dollars. It soon became a gateway for Bitcoin holders to exchange their BTC to USD via Linden Dollars. Eventually, other websites that offered dedicated exchange services in one form or another started to emerge. They became the market makers for BTC, and for the first time, allowed outsiders with no technical know-how to buy Bitcoins without needing to operate a mining node to earn Bitcoin via the process of Proof-of-Work. The possibility of simply buying Bitcoin raised the demand for the asset and influenced Bitcoin’s price. Various forms of exchanges started to emerge — first centralized and eventually decentralized exchanges. Today, many traditional banks also offer custodial services for Bitcoins. Early 2024 Bitcoin-based Exchange Traded Funds were authorized and introduced in the U.S.A (read more about exchanges in another book of the Token Economy Series titled “Money, NFTs & DeFi”).
• Merchants accepting Bitcoins Any merchant accepting Bitcoins as a method of payment is a market maker for the adoption of Bitcoin for day-o-day payments. They have the power to make or break the market for Bitcoin as a medium of exchange. Today, these merchants can either operate their own full node and wallets, or they can use third-party service providers for full node operation and wallet management, in which case they lose autonomy over their Bitcoins. Merchant adoption also depends on the legal status of Bitcoins in the country where the merchant operates. Countries with a high inflation rate or state-based Bitcoin acceptance tend to have more merchant adoption — legally or illegally — than other countries.
• External policymakers Even though nation-state-based policymakers are external to the Bitcoin ecosystem, they regulate the market viability of Bitcoin within the boundaries of a nation state and can sanction Bitcoin developers, users, exchanges, merchants and other internal and external service providers. Policymakers make or break the local market for Bitcoin both through non-regulation (creating uncertainty for entrepreneurs), Bitcoin-friendly regulation or through prohibitive regulation. While it is true that the Bitcoin network is geographically decentralized, and cannot be unilaterally censored by nation state-based legislation in one country only, the users and service operators on the edges of the network can always be sanctioned by local lawmakers. Mining node operators, users, service providers and the market makers that interface with the real world are subject to nation-state-based regulation and can be coerced into not accepting Bitcoins as a method of payment, not exchanging Bitcoins for other currencies, not developing code, not operating a node or not buying Bitcoins.
• Chain analytics companies The emergence of blockchain data analytics services such as “Chainanalysis” has also changed the dynamics of the Bitcoin ecosystem. These privately-operated companies analyze all publicly available transaction data of the Bitcoin network and correlate it with outside data points. They can identify economic data flows, individual spending patterns and ultimately also the identity of special interest wallets that might be relevant under anti-money laundering regulation, etc. This has made anonymous transactions quasi-impossible. Using flagging techniques based on chain analytics, regulators can coerce banks and centralized token exchanges to freeze the assets under anti-money laundering and similar regulation, and impact the fungibility and general acceptance of Bitcoins.
• Protocol developers are individuals who contribute to the improvement of the Bitcoin protocol. They are the internal policymakers of the Bitcoin network. Developers conceptualize the network rules in code, discuss them over various social media channels, and eventually make Bitcoin improvement proposals that can be adopted by the community of miners (or not). The Bitcoin protocol has no native reward mechanism for developer contributions, since it grew as an open-source project. The lack of direct incentives to develop the code has led to the situation that many Bitcoin developers are now funded by private individuals and institutions, who all have their own special interests. What once was a superpower of the Bitcoin network as it was still emerging, is becoming a serious challenge for decentralized Bitcoin development in the long run.
• Hardware producers & chip logic Satoshi expected that anyone could participate in Proof-of-Work (i.e. mine Bitcoins) using the central processing unit of standard computers, though it was anticipated in the white paper that the hardware requirements would grow over time. However, this happened much faster and differently than anticipated. The chip logic, as part of the hardware components necessary for operating mining nodes, interacts with the Bitcoin software, determines boundaries of the Bitcoin protocol, and influences the difficulty rate. Any progress in research and development of hardware chip logic impacts the costs and benefits of Bitcoin mining and therefore the Bitcoin ecosystem as a whole. Some node operators realized that the use of special gaming computers with better GPU and CPU gave them a competitive advantage in the race to create blocks. Specialized companies started to produce special-purpose mining rig hardware. Node operators started to use these special devices which were built around ASIC chips, which had greater hashing capacity at lower energy consumption. Today, people with normal computers have little to no chance of participating in Proof-of-Work. Mining rig producers have a lot of market power over the technical evolution of processing hardware and its cost, which ultimately has an effect on micro- and macroeconomic parameters of the Bitcoin ecosystem — the benefits of mining and the transaction costs that get passed on to Bitcoin users. As a result, these hardware producers also gained competitive advantage over other miners to operate mining pools, as they can do so at lower costs.
• Electricity market Similar to hardware producers, dynamics on electricity markets worldwide influence the micro- and macroeconomic conditions of the Bitcoin network. Availability, costs and the regulatory conditions influence the costs and benefits of Bitcoin mining. On the other hand, electricity providers can be affected by capacity issues related to Bitcoin mining. If managed wisely, Bitcoin mining operators can balance the excess loads of power grids while benefiting from lower energy costs. One possibility for mining pool operators is to collaborate with renewable energy producers (e.g. wind and solar) who typically create a lot of excess capacity and have a hard time adding their excess capacity to the power grids.
• Second layer protocols such as the “Lightning Network,” the “Liquid Network” or “Roostock” are being developed to improve the capabilities of the Bitcoin mainnet. The Lightning Network is a network of payment channels that is being developed to allow for faster and lower-cost transactions off the main Bitcoin network where users can open payment channels, send multiple transactions without each one needing to be recorded on the mainchain. Liquid is a federated sidechain for Bitcoin — it offers faster confirmation times and confidential transactions, making it useful for high-frequency trading and inter-exchange settlements. Rootstock is a smart contract protocol that adds smart contract functionality to the Bitcoin network, allowing developers to build decentralized applications on top of Bitcoin. All these networks enhance the capabilities of the Bitcoin ecosystem and influence general Bitcoin adoption.
• Alternative Web3 ecosystems The emergence of alternative cryptocurrencies has created alternative systems that might be faster, more versatile or more anonymous than the Bitcoin network. More privacy-preserving currencies have stayed a fringe phenomenon, mostly because of regulatory sanctions against them worldwide. The Ethereum network and similar blockchain networks, on the other hand, have created a more versatile Web3 infrastructure for the settlement of a wide variety of token-based applications, which drove a certain amount of innovation potential away from Bitcoin. Stable tokens in particular — which are mostly issued on the Ethereum network — have the biggest market transaction and have therefore created earning possibilities for Ethereum miners. The emergence of a wide range of alternative blockchain networks has not only created competition for Bitcoin but also strengthened general crypto/Web3 adoption, as well as research and development. Any innovation in other networks can positively influence protocol development within the Bitcoin ecosystem, and vice versa.

Token Types & Token Properties

• Minted upon Newly minted Bitcoins enter the ecosystem each time a new block of transaction is minted upon Proof-of-Work. As previously explained, they are attributed to the mining node that receives the block reward.
• Expiry date/event Bitcoins never expire, and also have no automated event upon which they might be burned. Bitcoins can be endlessly stored and hoarded, and will only be unattainable under two circumstances: (a) If the user loses their private key to authenticate themselves as the owner and sign transactions, or (b) once they leave the blockchain network into custodial wallets of centralized service providers such as merchants, exchanges or banks, and if they are mismanaged by those custodial service providers or frozen due to government coercion. It is unclear what really happens to those centrally managed Bitcoins behind the scenes.
• Rights attached Bitcoins represent a property right (network assets with certain aspects of currencies). Bitcoins also represent access and usage rights for network services, as they are the only accepted currency with which one can pay the transaction fees.
• Transferability Bitcoins are designed to be unconditionally transferable.
• Privacy As previously explained, Bitcoin has limited privacy by design due to a combination of factors: (i) It only exists as a string of digital signatures that can be traced back to the original transaction, (ii) because of the pseudonymous nature of Bitcoin identities, and because of (iii) the cryptographic primitives used. This pseudonymous nature of Bitcoin transactions is not at all comparable with the anonymous nature of cash, and also affects its practical fungibility (read more on the topic of privacy in another book of the Token Economy Series titled “Web3 Infrastructure”).
• Fungibility In theory, each Bitcoin is designed to be interchangeable with any other unit of Bitcoin, and therefore fungible, which is a core prerequisite for any currency. In practice, due to the above-mentioned pseudonymous nature of transactions, Bitcoins (or to be more precise, specific unspent transactions aka UTXOs) can get sanctioned by custodial service providers at the edges of the network who are subject to regulatory pressure from nation state regulation.
• Stability There are no provisions in the Bitcoin protocol to maintain price stability, which is why many stable token initiatives have emerged in recent years (read more about exchange rate stability and stable tokens in another book of the Token Economy Series titled “Money, NFTs & DeFi).

Economic Mechanisms

• Monetary policy The number of Bitcoin tokens was and still is limited to slightly under 21 million BTC. The number of BTC issued per block was designed to decrease by 50 percent every 210,000 blocks — approximately every four years. At the time of writing, the reward for successful block creation in the Bitcoin network is 6.25 BTC per block. The next “halving” of block rewards takes place in 2024. The last BTC is estimated to be mined and minted in 2140, when the block reward would drop below 1 “Satoshi” — the smallest denomination of BTC. It will be interesting to see how that will play out as from that point on, only transaction fees are paid to those providing network security. The combination of a fixed token supply with a decreasing issuance rate is often assumed to lead to deflationary price development, when demand surpasses the supply of new tokens, taking into account sunk tokens. Bitcoin’s supply is determined by the number of newly minted Bitcoins each year, minus the amount of all sunk or burnt Bitcoins.
• Network taxes As previously elaborated, mining node operators also collect transaction fees, which can be described as network taxes that are not paid to a common tax pool, but to the winning miner directly. The fees collected are determined based on several network parameters: (i) urgency of the transaction, (ii) network congestion, (iii) transaction size and (iv) general market conditions such as Bitcoin’s exchange rate. The fees can be set by the user who initiates a Bitcoin transaction and is directly paid to the miner who creates the block in which the transaction is included. As a result, miners tend to prioritize transactions with higher fees, as this increases their potential earnings. When the Bitcoin network experiences high demand for transactions, the available space in each block becomes limited. If users want their transactions to be confirmed quickly, they can choose to pay a higher fee to incentivize miners to prioritize their transaction. The size of a transaction in terms of bytes also plays a role in fee calculation. Larger transactions with more inputs and outputs require more space in the block and thus incur higher fees. When the value of Bitcoin rises significantly, users might be more willing to pay higher fees for faster transaction confirmations for trading purposes. It is technically possible to send Bitcoins without paying a transaction fee. However, if users set a fee that might be perceived as too low by miners — depending on market conditions — their transaction might take longer to be confirmed, especially during times of high network congestion, or it could even be dropped entirely. In this case they end up in a waiting position in Bitcoin’s mem-pool (the memory pool of unconfirmed transactions) until network congestion subsides and miners are willing to include it. Many Bitcoin wallets and crypto-exchanges provide fee estimation tools that help users estimate an appropriate fee based on current network conditions. Wallet operators offer predetermined options to either set their own fee when creating a Bitcoin transaction, and/or choose from a predefined set of fees such as low, medium, or high. Their user interface option can influence the Bitcoin fee market.
• Monetary policy changes There is no provision in the Bitcoin protocol for changing the monetary policy of Bitcoin. In fact, Bitcoin’s ideology prides itself on its scarcity and the “deflationary” monetary policy. While changing the monetary policy of the Bitcoin network is theoretically possible, it would require a social consensus of mining node operators, which is unlikely. A higher supply would very likely drive down the Bitcoin price and probably reduce miner profits — unless other unforeseeable factors come into play.
• Treasury & resource allocation As we will see in the analysis of other use cases, many DAOs today collect network taxes in a treasury smart contract and redistribute them to various types of stakeholders who contribute to the DAO. The Bitcoin network never had anything like a centralized treasury to fund its ongoing operation, research or development. Bitcoin was built by community contributors for free — which, at the time, was standard practice for open-source and free software development. As a result, code development and maintenance was initially performed by voluntary code contributors only. Marketing services were conducted inadvertently for free over social media by a community of Bitcoin enthusiasts. Full node operators, who are also important to the system, never had direct financial incentives for the previously mentioned reasons, and would often operate full nodes out of intrinsic motivation. Resource allocation in the form of newly minted Bitcoin tokens and network taxes was only designed to incentivize mining node operators who contributed with Proof-of-Work, for network execution and network security. This created considerable power asymmetries in the network, favoring mining node operators. We will discuss this in more detail later on in this chapter.
• Proof-of-Work’s difficulty adapter To compensate for increasing hardware speed and varying interest in running mining nodes over time, while deterring potential 51% attacks, the proof-of-work difficulty was “determined by a moving average targeting an average number of blocks per hour. If they’re generated too fast, the difficulty increases.”

Governance, Protocol Upgrades & Network Splits

Power Structures

• Executive power As opposed to other Web3 network or application level DAOs, the Bitcoin network has very limited functionalities, which are predominately executed by individual miners and mining pools according to the computational rules defined in the protocol. They execute Bitcoin transactions by co-validating them and adding blocks of transactions to the ledger. As opposed to other DAOs, there is no executive day-to-day management of the network via a foundation or other special-purpose incorporated entity and subcontractors that work for them.
• Policymaking power While in theory, anyone can make Bitcoin Improvement Proposals, only relatively few people globally have the know-how to understand the intricacies of the current code and propose rule changes. Full-time protocol developers are the only ones who can juggle the complexities and understand the cryptoeconomic intricacies of Bitcoin enough to make meaningful proposals to change the rules. At the time of writing this book, according to the commits on GitHub, around 300 protocol developers are more or less actively contributing to Bitcoin’s improvement. Given a global population of several billion people who can use this infrastructure, the level of decentralization of policymaking is questionable. Inclusion is only possible on a theoretical level. The fact that Bitcoin has no native mechanism to incentivize developers creates further power asymmetries. Personal ideology and reputation were reasons to contribute to the code in the early years of Bitcoin, but today, private companies such as mining pool operators and big Bitcoin holders have the economic power to fund protocol developers and pursue their own best interests. This puts a lot of policymaking power in the hands of this small group of “techno-priests,” at least until coding skills, higher mathematical skills and financial market know-how are taught across schools globally, so that real inclusion in policymaking is not only a shallow narrative. An index for comprehensibility of the code would be necessary to measure the actual level of political inclusion.
• Voting power As previously mentioned, only mining node operators can directly decide over protocol changes in the Bitcoin network. Only people who have the know-how and who can afford to operate mining nodes can influence the political fate of the network. Since their voting power depends on their hashing power, their voting power is directly correlated with the amount of money they are willing to invest in hardware and energy. In the case of mining pools, the case is a bit different. While anyone can become a co-investor of a mining pool and participate in the profits, these co-investors may or may not be included in the decision-making process by the mining pool operator, depending on the contractual agreement between pool operators and CPU contributors or co-investors. Users, on the other hand, have no direct possibility to vote over protocol changes, but they can use their market power to collectively coerce mining node operators into accepting a protocol upgrade, which they otherwise would not accept. Such coercive tactics via collective market power are referred to as UASF (User-Activated Soft Fork) or UAHF (User-Activated Hard Fork). This process requires a lot of coordination between users and a certain degree of technical know-how. To engage in a UASF or UAHF, users need to operate a full node or a light node, to be able to technically and therefore politically coordinate. Users who have their tokens managed by custodial service providers (such as exchanges or banks) cannot participate in a UASF or UAHF. Due to the increasing dominance and market concentration of mining pools, mining pool operators have a better ability to politically coordinate than individual users, since they are a smaller and more concentrated group. This gives mining pool operators disproportionate power compared to simple Bitcoin users — who are more scattered and are usually not as well coordinated.
• Market power Any Bitcoin holder has market power by entering or exiting the system. By selling their Bitcoin holdings, users can potentially influence the market price via a mass exodus. This means that those who own more Bitcoins have more proportional influence over the market price. As previously explained, they can also exercise indirect voting power via a UASF or UAHF, which might have market implications. Both mining node operators and wallet developers have market power over transaction fees: Mining node operators have the power to accept or decline transactions depending on the amount of fees users are willing to pay. Wallet providers control the user interface that gives the users the option to choose between fees or to set their own fee. Even though Bitcoin transactions can be theoretically sent without a fee, in practice, most wallets and exchanges have default fee policies that automatically attach a small fee to outgoing transactions. While some wallets and exchanges allow users to set their own custom fees, not all do. This means that wallet providers can collude with miners to make it harder for technically unskilled users to avoid paying fees. Merchants make or break a market via acceptance of Bitcoins as a medium of exchange. The same applies to exchanges, which can list or delist Bitcoins. External policymakers have ultimate coercive power over their citizens, residents, and companies that fall under their jurisdiction through regulation — and make or break the Bitcoin market within their jurisdiction. Hardware producers influence the market dynamics via the capacities and prices of input factors that miners need, as do electricity markets. Second-layer protocols and applications that complement the Bitcoin network can make the Bitcoin ecosystem more attractive. Competing Web3 protocols can drain the Bitcoin network from developers, node operators and users.
• Information & coordination power Experience has shown that the community dynamics that unfold in the process of protocol upgrades are quite similar to the public discussions in traditional media or on social media in the context of regional or national elections. The question is whether the Bitcoin community has enough institutionalized mechanisms to make sure stakeholders’ voices are heard, while balancing the interests of everyone. Information and know-how are key to practical inclusion in policymaking and to controlling the execution of policies. If a certain group of stakeholders can coordinate better than others, this could result in information asymmetries and power imbalances. From what it seems to me, information dissemination and coordination in the Bitcoin community is dominated by a Wild West culture predominantly driven by those who have the tech know-how, the financial power or the loudest voice in the chatroom. For example, there are many outspoken ideologists in the Bitcoin community — who are often referred to as “Bitcoin Maxis” or “Bitcoin Maximalists” — a very loud minority which influences the political discourse within the community and also externally. Information in Bitcoin is also relevant in the context of all historic ledger data. Since most users use hosted wallets or light nodes for managing their Bitcoins, they always rely on third-party servers to broadcast transactions to the network. These third-party services know the entire transaction history of their clients or the light nodes they relay. This situation not only creates information asymmetries, principal-agent issues, and policymaking asymmetries — it also creates privacy issues. Whether or not Bitcoin holders and wallet services providers operate their own full nodes (or any node at all) influences the information flow, coordination power and potential control.

Purpose & Reality

• Double spending challenge The Bitcoin protocol absolutely nailed this purpose. It achieved what many researchers and developers had not achieved before. It resolved the double-spending problem over the Internet in the absence of centralized trusted authorities. The Bitcoin protocol also sparked a renaissance of P2P network development.
• P2P electronic cash While the protocol resolved the double-spending problem, Bitcoin has not proven to be practical for everyday payments because of the constant and relatively high price fluctuations. At least, it is not an attractive option in economies that have relatively moderate inflation rates and currency stability. Satoshi did not provide a stability mechanism in the protocol, just a scarcity mechanism. Since exchange rate stability is a classic feature for money to serve as a medium of exchange, Bitcoin has become a digital asset that is more similar to scarce commodities such as gold — which is why some people refer to it as digital gold.
• Fees The aim of the Bitcoin protocol was to reduce the transaction costs of sending money, especially for international transfers and micropayments. Due to the unexpected level of Bitcoin adoption and Bitcoin speculation, and in the light of the rudimentary monetary and fiscal policy mechanisms, the average transaction fees have become much higher than originally anticipated. They do not allow for cheap day-to-day remittances or micropayments. This might change if second layer protocol solutions — built on top of the Bitcoin protocol — would manage to provide more transaction bandwidth at much lower costs. At the time of writing this book, the Bitcoin ecosystem still has a long way to go to meet this original value proposition.
• Privacy As previously explained, Bitcoins can be sanctioned at the edges of the network, where the permissionless Bitcoin network intersects with centralized exchanges and merchants who can be sanctioned by governments. Through the backdoor of these centralized institutions, Bitcoin (and similar cryptocurrencies that followed) have lost their pseudonymous features, and therefore also their censorship resistance and their fungibility. But even without exchanges and merchants, there are many ways to inadvertently unmask oneself with BTC, for example, if one’s address has been previously published as a donation address on social media or other public communication channels. Satoshi addressed these privacy issues and expected people to create a new wallet and thereby a new public key for each Bitcoin transaction. Creating a new wallet for each transaction was impractical, so Bitcoin wallet developers started to implement this as a feature. However, this turned out to be an insufficient privacy strategy, as even less sophisticated chain-analysis can quite easily reveal the identity of most users, not to mention governmental institutions with access to other associated data sets. The lack of fully autonomous privacy features in Bitcoin sparked an innovation cycle around privacy-preserving P2P payment solutions — both within the Bitcoin community and with Bitcoin forks that were more privacy-preserving from the get-go (read more on token privacy in another book of the Token Economy Series titled “Web3 Infrastructure”).
• Economic assumptions The economic assumptions upon which Proof-of-Work was conceptualized seem to have built on simple game theory, not collaborative game theory. As a result, the Bitcoin network has become a much more centralized system than originally intended. Some people therefore argue that the reality of Bitcoin’s consensus mechanism can be described as a “delegated Proof-of-Work,” and that it has become an oligopoly of a handful of mining pools, which might not reflect the original intentions of Bitcoin’s creator, Satoshi Nakamoto.
• Stakeholders & power structures The historic evolution of the Bitcoin protocol is the best proof that, due to the complex nature of socioeconomic networks, it is hard to foresee their future development. The assumptions under which one designs a DAO must always be considered incomplete. As previously discussed, the Bitcoin white paper only envisioned two types of node operators who would participate in maintaining the network: mining node operators and light node operators (aka SPV-nodes). Full node operators and mining pool operators only emerged after the protocol was deployed, but were never accounted for in the economic calculations outlined by Satoshi. The same was true for exchanges, chain analytics companies, full node service providers or wallet-as-a-service providers. The emergence of all these unanticipated stakeholders changed the political and economic dynamics of the network and greatly influenced the power structures within the network.

REFERENCES